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Abstract 
 
Studies examining welfare-to-work program effectiveness present mixed and sometimes 
discrepant findings, partly due to research design, data, and methodological limitations.  Using 
administrative data on Missouri and North Carolina welfare recipients, we substantially improve 
on past estimation approaches to identify the distinct effects of each state's welfare-to-work 
sub-programs—assessment, job search assistance and job readiness training, and more intensive 
programs designed to augment human capital.  More intensive training is associated with greater 
initial earnings losses but also greater long-run earnings gains.  The negative program impacts 
we observe in quarters immediately following participation turn positive by the second year after 
participation.  
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I.  Introduction 
Public expenditures in programs designed to move welfare recipients into the labor market—
commonly known as welfare-to-work programs—are made with the expectation that these 
services will increase participants= employment success both by aiding their search activities and 
by improving their general skill levels.  Yet a growing number of studies examining the 
effectiveness of state programs to help welfare recipients become employed and exit welfare 
present mixed and sometimes discrepant findings.  Reasons for these mixed findings include 
inadequacies in research design, data, and methodologies for assessing program effects.  Many 
studies treat welfare-to-work programs as a single entity, when, in fact, these programs typically 
consist of various sub-programs, each providing distinct types of training such as basic 
education, job preparation and search assistance, and/or vocational and on-the-job training.  If 
outcomes differ by sub-program, then conflicting findings could reflect states’ emphases on 
different sub-programs within their overall welfare-to-work program.   
Conflicting findings have, in turn, engendered an active debate over whether strategies 
designed to provide more intensive training are more effective in assuring welfare recipients= 
labor market success than those intended to help welfare recipients get into jobs quickly—known 
as Awork-first@ approaches.  Barnow and Gubits (2002) review a large number of studies of 
welfare-to-work program outcomes and report that longer-term, intensive training strategies 
appear to be considerably more effective than short-term work-first strategies.  Alternatively, in a 
meta-analysis of 27 experimental evaluations of 116 welfare-to-work interventions, Greenberg, 
Cebulla and Bouchet (2005) determine that job search has persistent positive impacts on labor 
market outcomes, while basic education, vocational training and work experience have marginal 
or negative impacts.  Finally, Bloom and Michalopolous (2001) review experimental evaluations 
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of 20 programs and conclude that the most effective programs combined employment-focused 
and education/training strategies with the flexibility to determine the appropriate mix of 
approaches for a given individual.  These conclusions are at least partly at odds with the mid-
1990s welfare reforms, which were predicated on the belief that welfare recipients needed jobs, 
not education and training, to advance in the labor market (Haskins and Blank, 2001). 
In this paper we use administrative data on welfare recipients in the states of Missouri 
and North Carolina to obtain separate estimates of the effects of participating in sub-programs of 
each state=s welfare-to-work program.  Our data consist of all women who enter welfare between 
1997:2 and 1999:4.  We follow recipients for up to sixteen quarters after they enter welfare and 
model their quarterly earnings as a function of demographic characteristics, prior welfare and 
work experience, and the specific types of welfare-to-work programs in which they participate.  
We divide training into three categories on the basis of the intensity of the activity: 
participants who went through an assessment but received no other training; participants in job 
readiness or job search activities; and participants who receive more intensive training, including 
basic education, vocational skills training, or other longer-term programs.  We estimate the effect 
of each training program using propensity score matching techniques that match individuals 
receiving treatment with similar individuals in a comparison sample.  Our results, particularly for 
Missouri, indicate a clear pattern: over the long run, more intensive training programs produce 
larger and more persistent returns than short-run work-first strategies.  Combined with similar 
findings in Hotz, Imbens and Klerman (2005), these results suggest that the current emphasis on 
work-first activities is misplaced and argue for a greater emphasis on training activities designed 
to enhance participants’ human capital. 
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The remainder of the paper is as follows.  In the next section we provide a brief review of 
relevant literature.  In section III, we describe our data and present an overview of our empirical 
approach.  In section IV, we introduce the various sub-programs that are part of each state=s 
welfare-to-work program and describe observed patterns of earnings for participants.  Section V 
spells out the models underlying our estimation strategy, and section VI gives details of the 
estimation methods and reports the results of specification tests.  Program effect estimates are 
reported in section VII, and section VIII concludes.  
 
II. Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Programs 
Literature reviews by Leahey (2001) and Barnow and Gubits (2002) highlight important areas of 
disagreement among researchers regarding the effects of programs designed to increase the 
employment, earnings, and probability of exit among women receiving welfare.  Barnow and 
Gubits (2002) note that one reason for these inconsistent findings is that many studies group low-
cost, job-oriented activities together with the traditionally more intensive and expensive on-the-
job training programs, essentially muddling the distinction between a work-first strategy and one 
intended to increase general human capital.  Some studies are plagued by unreliable records of 
individuals' participation in specific program activities.  Furthermore, as Grogger, Karoly and 
Klerman (2002) observe, measures of program characteristics used in many studies, including 
experimental evaluations, typically only capture variation in official policies, not the actual 
variation that emerges in the implementation of welfare-to-work programs. 
Approaches to aiding welfare recipients that focus on building human capital are rarely 
fully developed and implemented in welfare-to-work programs (Gueron and Pauly, 1991; Jencks 
and Edin, 1992; Friedlander and Burtless, 1995).  Even among programs that implement such 
strategies, few have collected sufficient longitudinal data to fully assess their effects.  Studies 
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that assess effects beyond three years tend to reach different conclusions than short-term 
assessments; see, for example, both the shorter-term and longer-term analyses of the effects of 
Riverside, California's GAIN program (Riccio et al., 1994 and Hotz, Imbens and Klerman, 2005) 
and Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan=s research on displaced workers (1994, 2004).1   
Definitions of what constitutes longer- versus shorter-term programs also differ widely, 
complicating comparisons across studies.  Some of the Alonger-term,@ intensive education and 
training strategies in current welfare-to-work programs limit participation to 12 weeks.  This 
contrasts with the earlier Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) and Job Training 
Partnership Act (JTPA) programs, which generally defined long-term training as lasting six 
months to two years.  In addition, few studies assess the cumulative effects of multiple, short-
term episodes of participation in these types of program activities. 
More generally, the existing literature makes clear that researchers need better measures 
of welfare-to-work and training program activities and more precise definitions of what is being 
measured.  Our study aims to improve on the current literature in several ways.  We examine 
participation in specific welfare-to-work program activities over a period when the emphasis on 
and use of alternative service strategies were changing.  With comprehensive information on the 
types of services provided and timing of participation, we assess the average and cumulative 
effects of different types of program activities on welfare recipients' outcomes.  We use complete 
data on the populations of welfare recipients in two states, facilitating a comparison of program 
effects across sites using the same approach and methods of analysis.  Finally, we follow 
                                                 
1In the GAIN program, Riverside=s emphasis on job search activities contrasted with policies in other 
counties, particularly Alameda and Los Angeles, which emphasized human capital development and had more 
registrants in basic skills activities.  Adjusted difference-in-differences comparisons of Riverside with Alameda and 
Riverside with Los Angeles showed that initial differences in program effects (on employment and earnings) were 
large and in favor of Riverside; however, in later years (4-6), Los Angeles and Alameda had better program 
outcomes than in Riverside, although the final differences were not statistically significant (Hotz, Imbens and 
Klerman, 2005). 
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participants for up to 16 quarters after they first enter the program, allowing us to examine the 
long-run effects of training.   
 
III.  Data and Method of Analysis 
We examine employment outcomes for welfare recipients in the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) programs in Missouri and North Carolina.  Our analysis relies on 
earnings data collected by the states in support of their unemployment insurance programs.  
Employers report total earnings for each individual in covered employment during each quarter.  
We merge this information with records used in administering the states’ welfare programs, 
including demographic and household information.  While the earnings data omit self-
employment, illegal or informal employment, and a small number of jobs not covered by 
unemployment insurance, the overwhelming majority of employment within each state is 
included.   
For welfare recipients in Missouri, we use employment data collected by the states of 
Missouri and Kansas, ensuring employment coverage for welfare recipients in Kansas City, 
Missouri, who often work in Kansas.2  For welfare recipients in North Carolina, we use that 
state=s employment data.  Of course, employment will be understated for individuals who move 
out of state after leaving welfare.3  We correct all earnings measures for inflation relative to 
1997:2.  We restrict our sample to female payees, age 18 but less than 65 years, in single parent 
                                                 
2About one in seven jobs held by welfare recipients in Jackson County (the central county in the Kansas 
City metropolitan area) is in Kansas.  In St. Louis, the proportion holding jobs in Illinois is much lower. 
3Kornfeld and Bloom (1997) compare experimental (job-training program) earnings impact estimates 
calculated using unemployment insurance (UI) earnings data with those based on other more costly earnings data 
sources and conclude that UI data provide valid estimates for all low income persons except a small subgroup of 
male youths with past arrests.  
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households, excluding Achild only@ cases.4  We use quarters as our time unit, so that an individual 
who receives TANF cash payments at any point during a given quarter is considered a welfare 
recipient during that quarter.  This approach tends to smooth welfare receipt, eliminating 
apparent movements off of welfare that are due to administrative errors that cause a case to be 
omitted from the files for a month or two.5  We focus on individuals who are “new entrants” into 
the TANF cash program during the quarters 1997:2 through 1999:4, defining a new entrant as 
one who receives payments during at least one of these quarters but not the prior quarter.  We 
then follow these individuals for a total of up to 16 quarters, identifying their participation in 
work component activities and their earnings during each quarter.6 
Our dependent variable is earnings obtained in a specific outcome quarter.  Determinants 
include individual characteristics, labor market experience and welfare receipt prior to entering 
welfare, local unemployment rates during the outcome quarter, and work component 
participation after entering welfare.  Since an individual who enters welfare and then obtains 
adequate employment will subsequently be required to move off of welfare, taking account of 
welfare exits would be tantamount to controlling for labor market success.  We therefore 
structure our analysis to predict earnings in the 16 quarters beginning with welfare entry 
regardless of whether the individual leaves welfare during that period. 
For an individual who leaves welfare for at least one quarter and then returns, we must 
decide how to treat each entry onto welfare.  Eliminating subsequent welfare entries after the 
first observed entry would omit later welfare entries but not earlier ones.  We therefore treat each 
                                                 
4The payee in a child only case is not a parent and receives payment on behalf of the children.  Such payees 
normally do not face work or training requirements, and their income does not count in the calculation of benefits. 
5Luks and Brady (2003) studied the definition of welfare spells and concluded that because of 
Aadministrative churning,@ a break of up to three months is necessary in most cases to say with confidence that a 
recipient has gone off of welfare. 
6We do not have a full 16 quarters of follow-up data for those entering TANF near the end of our entry 
window. 
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entry onto welfare separately, counting the 16 quarters from that entry even if those same 
quarters are also included in the period following a prior or subsequent entry.7  The analysis 
should thus be properly viewed as identifying earnings outcomes following a particular entry 
onto welfare.   
We control for the extent of welfare experience in the two years prior to welfare entry, 
but we do not control for past participation in welfare-to-work activities or other training.  
Hence, the estimated impact of welfare-to-work (or work component) 8 participation is an 
incremental impact, indicating the effect beyond any training received prior to entering welfare.  
These estimates thus address the appropriate policy question of how the Aaverage@ welfare 
recipient=s earnings trajectory is affected by these welfare-to-work program activities. 
In examining estimated impacts of the program, we group work components into three 
categories based on their relative intensity: 1) assessment, 2) job search/readiness training, and 3) 
intensive training.  Earnings impacts are assumed to result from the most intensive service 
received in the period since entering welfare.  We provide an extensive discussion of this 
categorization in the subsequent section, in part to explicate how our measures of program 
activities improve on those of previous studies. 
Our use of administrative data allows us access to very large samples.  In Missouri, we 
base our analyses on 60,483 unique individuals who meet our sample criteria and who enter 
welfare a total of 69,551 times during our sample window.  In North Carolina, we have 73,837 
                                                 
7We found that in both Missouri and North Carolina, approximately one in ten quarters in our analysis 
appears twice, with less than 1 percent of earnings quarters appearing more than twice. 
8We use the term Awork component@ to refer to the particular components or sub-programs of welfare-to-
work program activities. 
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unique individuals, who enter welfare 82,056 times.9  In each state, our estimates of program 
effects are based on more than 800,000 quarters of earnings data for these individuals. 
 
IV.  Work Component Activities 
The emphasis on moving welfare recipients to work began to take concrete form in the early 
1990s with the implementation of the federal JOBS program, which required states to provide 
explicit services to recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).  These 
programs expanded during the decade under federal waivers to states that allowed modification 
of the AFDC program and then under the federal reforms that replaced AFDC with Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).10  North Carolina was an early implementer of these 
reforms, emphasizing a work-first approach that focused primarily on getting recipients into jobs 
and secondarily on training to improve skills.  North Carolina=s TANF program began in January 
1997 with a Aprimary focus on job placement assistance.@11  Missouri=s approach was less clear. 
Having emphasized long-term training under JOBS, Missouri’s program was modified in the 
direction of work-first only in the face of federal pressure implicit in the TANF rules.  
Nonetheless, Missouri=s TANF program, which began in December 1996, retained a greater 
emphasis on long-term training, and by 2000, Missouri had managed another policy turnaround, 
adopting rules that increased the ability of TANF recipients to engage in long-term training. 
Work Component Categories 
We have classified the various work component activities into six categories that allow 
comparability between Missouri and North Carolina.  Table 1 provides basic information on the 
                                                 
 9 These counts omit individuals with missing data on variables used in our analysis, or with invalid Social 
Security numbers.  Fewer than 0.5 percent of data were omitted for these reasons in either state.  
10See Grogger and Karoly (2005) for a comprehensive summary of state policy changes in the transition 
from AFDC to TANF. 
11North Carolina=s TANF website describes its approach as Agrounded in the >work-first= philosophy@: 
http://www.joblink.state.nc.us/centers/resources.asp. 
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character of these activities.  We present statistics on the duration of each activity and the 
number of hours per week of participation normally scheduled.  We have calculated duration as 
the number of weeks between the date the activity commences and the date when it is completed. 
As expected, there are substantial differences between activities in their duration and 
intensity, as well as differences between states.  The first category, assessment, may include 
formal paper-and-pencil testing, as well as development of a Aself-sufficiency plan,@ which 
provides a schedule of activities leading to employment and exit from TANF.  In North Carolina, 
these activities usually take around three hours per week and extend for less than two weeks.  In 
Missouri, both the reported duration and intensity of assessment activities are greater, but the 
longer duration is likely at least partly due to systematic errors in data entry.12 
Job search and job readiness components appear to have similar levels of intensity in both 
locations, although the upper tail is much higher for Missouri, likely reflecting data errors.  The 
types of activities defined as Awork experience@ may differ appreciably across programs.  
Nonetheless, the patterns of participation are similar in the two states, again with the exception 
of Missouri=s longer upper tail. 
Basic education includes attendance in public schools up through twelfth grade and 
English as a second language instruction, although the largest category by far is adult education 
and literacy programs, such as those preparing individuals for the high school equivalency 
diploma.  Interestingly, the median number of weeks is slightly greater in North Carolina than in 
Missouri, although there are more individuals with very long recorded involvement in Missouri.  
                                                 
12Although case managers are formally required to specify the date when assessment is completed, in 
practice they may frequently fail to enter it.  In some cases, this may occur when individuals are classified as exempt 
or are removed from the program for reasons unrelated to program participation.  By statute, assessment can take no 
more than 30 days, in contrast to a median reported assessment time of 4.9 weeks.  We were told that apparent 
deviations from the 30-day limit very likely reflect entry errors.  We suspect that end dates for other work 
component activities may be recorded with error as well. 
 10
The typical vocational and technical skills training component lasts about nine weeks in 
Missouri but only six weeks in North Carolina.  In the case of post-secondary education, the 
median involvement is about 20 weeks in Missouri but only 14 in North Carolina.  Yet, the 
number of hours of involvement per week is much higher in North Carolina, with the median 
over 40 hours as compared to less than 20 in Missouri, very likely due to coding differences.13 
Despite differences in the duration of training, it is worth noting that the median duration 
of participation is short in all activities, less than 10 weeks in every category except for post-
secondary education.  Differences in duration among recipients in a particular type of activity are 
greater in Missouri than in North Carolina, due largely to the longer upper tail in the Missouri 
distribution.  In the analysis that follows, we will focus on effects as measured from the quarter 
of initial participation in an activity.  It must be understood that earnings in the quarter in which 
individuals participate, and possibly subsequent quarters, will be depressed if there is a period of 
extended participation and the program precludes or substitutes for immediate employment. 
We use this approach, rather than considering time after completion, for several reasons.  
First, we are unsure about the validity of program end dates, especially in the Missouri data (see 
footnote 12).  Second, and perhaps more important, we are concerned that even if the exit date 
were properly coded for an individual spending an extended period in a component, the end date 
might be endogenous with employment success.  It would not be surprising if those registered for 
an extended period would be discontinued when they obtained employment (see, for example, 
Courty and Marschke’s 2004 analysis of JTPA program exits).  Third, we believe that even 
                                                 
13In Missouri, caseworkers are instructed to include in the scheduled hours one hour of study for each class 
hour, so 17 scheduled hours would indicate 8.5 hours of classes per week, more than half-time in most colleges.  We 
suspect that the 42.5 hours per week scheduled in North Carolina reflects a more liberal coding for study time. 
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where measures of time in a program are not problematic, program impact is more meaningfully 
measured if it applies to periods during participation in the program. 
This approach treats time spent in a program as comparable with other factors that may 
delay movement into productive employment.  Implicitly we are assuming that a program lasting 
six months which immediately places individuals in appropriate employment is not necessarily 
better than a three month program that requires individuals to spend three additional months 
obtaining suitable employment.  In the discussion that follows, when we refer to the time of 
program participation or receipt of services, we are referring to the quarter when participation in 
the activity first began.  Although for a large share of participants, measured program completion 
occurs within that same quarter, for some individuals it will extend to subsequent quarters. 
In order to avoid problems associated with small numbers of observations, we group 
together activities in the bottom four categories in Table 1 as “intensive training” or “intensive 
services.”  Although there is appreciable variation among them, in both states median duration is 
longer for each of these categories than for assessment or job search/readiness training.  Our use 
of three categories of participation—assessment, job search/readiness training, and intensive 
training—also allows us to easily compare the effect of work-first activities, such as job search, 
with more intensive activities, such as vocational education, that are designed to enhance 
participants= human capital. 
Table 2 provides information on the ordering of component participation for individuals 
participating in at least one component in the 16 quarters since entering welfare.  For each case, 
we consider only the first occurrence of an activity, and we count activities occurring within the 
same quarter as ties.  For each row, the base is the number of welfare entries in which the listed 
activity occurred in our 16-quarter window.  For example, we see that for cases where 
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assessment occurred in Missouri, it occurred (for the first time) in a quarter prior to any other 
activity in 52 percent of the cases.14  In an additional 35 percent of cases, assessment occurred in 
the same quarter as the first occurrence of another activity.  This means that of those who receive 
assessment, 85 percent in Missouri receive it in the first quarter that they receive any component.  
In North Carolina, the comparable figure is 98 percent.   
The two states differ more dramatically, however, in the likelihood that an individual 
who participates in job search/readiness, or intensive training does so in a quarter prior to any 
other activity.  In Missouri, nearly half of those who participate in job search/readiness do so in a 
quarter prior to receiving any other service, and nearly a third of those in intensive training 
participate in a quarter prior to receiving any other training.  In contrast, fewer than 10 percent of 
those in North Carolina participate in these more intensive services without also participating in 
another component—usually assessment. 
Since a large share of participants enter more than one type of component, we must 
decide how to gauge impacts in such cases.  A simple additive model assumes that a component 
contributes to outcomes without regard for whether it is combined with other components.  Such 
an approach would require that we decide how individuals who participate in more than one 
component within our categories are treated.  In keeping with our focus on the impact of 
component intensity, we identify the type of training by the highest intensity component that the 
individual participated in since coming onto welfare.  In particular, a quarter is coded as 
Aassessment only@ if the individual received assessment services at some point since coming onto 
welfare but has not received any other work component services.  A quarter is coded as Ajob 
search/readiness@ in quarters following receipt of such services, as long as the individual has not 
received any “intensive” services to that point.  Finally, a quarter is coded as “intensive services” 
                                                 
 14 This includes those cases where it was the only activity. 
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following the receipt of intensive services, without regard for whether any other services were 
previously received.  Hence, the intensive service category includes any effects of other services 
received by such individuals, and impact estimates must be interpreted accordingly.  Table 3 
illustrates the way in which services are coded.  
Timing of Program Participation 
TANF recipients are most likely to participate in work components in the first year after entering 
the program.  Table 4 indicates job component participation by quarter since entering welfare for 
the sample of cases entering welfare in 1997:2-1997:4.  In keeping with our hierarchical coding, 
we identify only the highest order activity up to the quarter indicated.  Column 6 shows that in 
Missouri, 10 percent of the sample participates in some component in the entry quarter; for North 
Carolina, this number is 9 percent.  In both states, the proportion who had participated in at least 
one component increases to over 20 percent in the quarter following entry and exceeds half by 
the end of our 16-quarter period.  Of individuals who had participated in at least one work 
component in the four years after entering TANF, about 80 percent had participated in the first 
two years in both states. 
The chance of participation declines over time in part because, after several quarters, a 
substantial portion of recipients have left welfare.  Those who have not participated in any 
component are distinguished in columns 1 and 2 in the table by whether they were receiving 
TANF in the specified quarter or had exited welfare.  Comparing the columns, we see that by 
quarter 3 most who had not participated in any component had left welfare, and by quarter 11, 
about 95 percent of those who had not participated had left welfare.  These patterns in part reflect 
the strict participation requirements for welfare recipients following the 1996 welfare reforms.  
In turn, it is clear that the welfare exit rate has an important impact on the pattern of overall 
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participation in work component activities, since almost everyone who continues to receive 
welfare participates in a work component within several years. 
In both states, of those participating in a component in their first quarter, more than half 
participate in assessment only, while about a quarter in both states are listed as participants in job 
search/readiness (they may or may not have participated in assessment).  More than twice as 
many participants in Missouri (as in North Carolina)—nearly a third of those participating in 
some component—participate in an intensive activity in the first quarter.  As we look at later 
quarters, we see that there is greater involvement in intensive activities in Missouri, but that by 
the end of the 16 quarters, most of the difference has disappeared.  It is useful to note that in both 
Missouri and North Carolina, the number of recipients coded as having participated in 
assessment remains steady after about the eighth quarter.  This implies that although new 
participants may be assessed each quarter, an equal number of those who were assessed in prior 
quarters are receiving other services.15 
Program Participation and Earnings Patterns 
It is well-known that individuals who enter training and related programs for the disadvantaged 
often experience earnings declines associated with initial program participation, reflecting 
program requirements as well as self-selection.  Individuals in our sample enter into welfare and 
then participate in work component activities, and thus we might anticipate that this 
“Ashenfelter’s Dip” would be observed for both.  Figures 1 and 2 show average earnings for 
                                                 
 15In an earlier version of the paper, we also examined how participation had changed for those entering 
welfare during the period of our study (Dyke, Heinrich, Mueser and Troske, 2005).  We saw in both states that the 
chance of participation in at least one component increased from about 40 percent to over 50 percent.  The two more 
intensive activities showed substantial increases, both increasing by more than 50 percent.  The assessment category 
did not increase over time.  This is a result of the fact that although more individuals are, in fact, receiving 
assessment services, the growth in other services hides this.  Our analysis of work component participation suggests 
that the differences in welfare-to-work strategies adopted by North Carolina and Missouri are primarily rhetorical, 
and that patterns of participation in the different activities are not only similar, but changing in similar ways over 
time. 
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Missouri and North Carolina, respectively, over eight quarters prior to welfare entry and the 
subsequent ten quarters. 
The top graph shows earnings for individuals who do not participate in any work 
component over the 16 quarters beginning with the quarter of welfare entry.  Looking at the 
second quarter prior to program entry, we see that earnings are about $1200 in Missouri and 
$1400 in North Carolina, but in both states there is a decline of approximately $600 in the 
quarter of entry onto welfare.  Over the subsequent ten quarters, we see that earnings increase, 
ultimately exceeding $1600 in both states. 
For the lower graphs in the figures, average earnings are identified for individuals who 
participate in at least one work component activity, separated by the starting quarter of that 
activity.  In both states, we see two earnings dips, one for welfare entry and the other for 
participation.  Where work component participation occurs within three quarters of welfare 
entry, earnings decline from welfare entry to quarter of participation.  For later participation, 
there is an increase in earnings followed by a decline in the quarter of participation.  Especially 
for those receiving services several quarters after welfare entry, the decline in earnings in the 
quarter of participation is greatest for those participating in intensive training.  Generally, the 
decline for assessment is least severe.  Perhaps most remarkable is the similarity in patterns 
between the states.  These patterns underscore the importance of taking into account individuals’ 
selection into welfare as well as possible selection into work components.    
 
V.  Models of Impact and Estimation Strategy 
Entry onto welfare is selective not only of particular kinds of individuals but is also selective 
along a temporal dimension for these individuals.  For individuals who are normally employed, 
entry onto welfare will occur in a period where there is an unexpected negative shock.  Insofar as 
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such circumstances are not perfectly correlated over time, subsequent earnings would be 
expected to increase even in the absence of government intervention.  Therefore, we control for 
the time since entry onto welfare.  Our approach accounts for Aregression to the mean@ and for 
the impacts of the TANF program that may not be captured in work component participation. 
The model underlying our estimation strategy can be written as 
 0' '( )
s s s
itd it td it itdY Y X= + δ + ε , (1) 
where sitdY is earnings for individual i, d quarters after receiving service s in quarter t, where no 
higher level service was received up through t’=t+d  (see Table 3 for an example of how earnings 
are coded).  All times are expressed relative to the time coming onto welfare, so t=0 implies that 
the service is received in the quarter in which the individual entered welfare, and t=1 implies the 
service is received in the first quarter following entry, etc.  Individuals’ characteristics and other 
factors (e.g., the county unemployment rate) for the outcome quarter t’ are captured in Xit’; 
'( )
s
td itXδ  is the expected impact of the service in quarter t’=t+d expressed as a function of 
individual characteristics and calendar quarter (captured in Xit’); and 0'itY  is expected earnings in 
quarter t’=t+d in the absence of participating in any work component since entering welfare.  
The error term is given by sitdε , and we assume '( ) 0sitd itE Xε = . 
The structure of effects on earnings in this model is quite general, in that characteristics 
may influence earnings in a way that can vary idiosyncratically across service and outcome 
quarter.  For individual i, the impact of program participation in t on earnings in quarter t’=t+d  
is given as  
0
' '( )
s s s
itd it td it itdY Y X− = δ + ε .                                                      (2) 
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We are primarily interested in estimates of the average impact of participating in service s 
in quarter t on earnings d quarters later for those who actually receive services, i.e., the effect of 
the treatment on treated individuals.  This can be written as ( ( ))td tdE Xδ = δ , where the  
expectation is across the characteristics of participants who receive services in t and who have 
received no higher level services in the following d quarters.  We also consider the expected 
impact of service on earnings d quarters later, averaging across quarters in which the service was 
received.  We write this as ( ( ))d tdE Xδ = δ .  This average is across participants receiving 
services in all quarters who had not received higher level services in the following d quarters. 
For any one individual, there are a large number of potential wages conditional on the 
receipt and timing of services, but we only observe those wages associated with services that 
were actually received, that is, we observe 
 0 0' ' ' '
{1,2,3}
{ 0 '}
(  & )( )sit it it it itd it
s
t t t t
Y Y D s s t t Y Y
∈
∈ ≤ ≤
= + = = −∑ , 
where sit’ (sit’ =0, 1, 2, or 3) is the highest order service actually received by individual i from the 
quarter of welfare entry through quarter t’; tit’ is the quarter in which that service was first 
received; d=t’-t; and D is an indicator dummy taking on a value of 1 to identify the particular 
treatment received and its timing.  If the individual has not received any service up through t’, 
then sit’=0, and the summation drops out.16 
We estimate our model using propensity score matching.  Matching methods are more 
general than linear models in that they provide estimates of program effects that relax several 
assumptions of the linear model.  First, these models recognize that program effects may differ 
across individuals, explicitly producing estimates that are averages in the specified population.  
                                                 
 16 When sit’ =0, we arbitrarily set tit’ =0. 
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In addition, linear regression models may perform poorly when participants and comparison 
groups have significantly different values on control variables.  In extreme cases, some treated 
cases may not have any comparable cases in the comparison sample.  A matching approach 
allows us to identify such failures of common support. 
The critical assumption necessary in order to apply matching methods to obtain estimates 
of the treatment effect on the treated individuals is that participation in a work component 
activity and its timing are conditionally independent of the earnings that would be received in the 
absence of participation.  Since the earnings an individual would receive during this quarter in 
the absence of any participation are 0'itY  (t’=t+d), the independence condition can be written as  
  (3) 
where sit’ and tit’ identify the services and timing of participation for i, as defined above.  Given 
this assumption, for a given case i, it is possible to obtain an unbiased estimate of 0'itY  for an 
individual i who received service sit’>0 by using the earnings of individuals who received no 
services up through quarter t’ but who have the same values of Xit.  We write the estimate of 
program impact for individual i as  
                                          0' '( )
s s
itd itd t itY Y Xδ = −                                                  (4) 
where 0' '( )t itY X is estimated earnings in outcome quarter t’=t+d based on comparison cases 
receiving no services through quarter t’ that are matched with the participant case i.   
We use radius matching based on propensity scores, incorporating a bias adjustment 
procedure.  Given that the timing of participation in a component may not be random, we use a 
propensity score matching approach structured to reflect the dynamics of the participation 
decision.  Our method is similar to that used by Sianesi (2004) and Fitzenberg, Osikominu and 
Völter (2005) in similar settings.  The following section describes our methods in greater detail. 
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 We obtain average impact estimates as the mean impact across all participants 
(1/ )
td
s s
td itdtd
i T
N
∈
δ = δ∑  , 
where Ttd is the set of individuals receiving service in quarter t who have not received any higher 
level service d quarters later, and Ntd the number of such individuals.  We then have 
(1/ )
s s
d tdd td
t
N Nδ = δ∑  , 
where d td
t
N N= ∑ is the sum of all participants with observed earnings d quarters after receipt 
of service s.17 
Controlling for Program Selection 
Perhaps the most important challenge to the assumption of conditional independence specified 
above is that participation in work component programs is, by institutional design, nonrandom, 
and the factors that enter into this decision are not directly observable.  The possibility that 
selection may play a role in the earnings outcome we observe is underscored by the patterns we 
observe in Figures 1 and 2, which show that participants experience an earnings dip in the 
quarters prior to participation in a work component.   
Whether a TANF recipient is required to participate in a work component activity, and 
the activity that is recommended, depends on the circumstances of the recipient.  Program rules 
exempt certain recipients from participation, such as individuals with very young children.  
                                                 
 17In a previous version of the paper (Dyke, Heinrich, Mueser and Troske, 2005), we employed a simplified 
version of (1), ' '
s s
itd it t d itdY X= β + γ + δ + ε .  We estimated sdδ  both with OLS and an instrumental variables 
estimation approach, using variation over time in the level of participation in training programs across counties as 
the identifying variable.  Instrumental variable estimates were generally implausible, suggesting that the identifying 
variable was correlated with unmeasured labor market differences.  Simple OLS estimates of sdδ  were generally 
reasonable, but in some cases they were not robust when the model was fitted on alternative subsamples, suggesting 
that the specification was too restrictive.  Although we could have developed more general linear models, 
incorporating interaction effects, a matching strategy both implies a substantially more general model and explicitly 
takes account of differences in program impact across individuals. 
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Other exemptions are based on the judgment of the caseworker, as where an individual is viewed 
as facing personal obstacles that make it too difficult to engage in training or employment.   
There is also an element of personal choice.  In Missouri, individuals who fail to 
participate in required programs face sanctions that reduce their payments (generally by about 25 
percent) but are permitted to continue receiving these reduced TANF benefits until the five years 
of eligibility is exhausted.  However, in North Carolina, those who fail to cooperate can have the 
full value of their benefit withheld.  Equally important, in both Missouri and North Carolina, 
individuals who work a minimum number of hours are exempted from participation in work 
component activities.  As a result, those who participate may be individuals whose labor market 
opportunities are particularly limited or who are facing an extended streak of bad luck.   
We consider a more plausible alternative model that acknowledges the possibility of 
selection on unmeasured factors.  This model makes two additional assumptions: first, that 
selection into service is the same for the three classes of service, and second, that assessment 
provides minimal benefits to those who receive only assessment: 
                                              0' ' ' ' '| , , ',  for 0it it it it itY s X t t s⊥ > ;                                              (5) 
 
1
'( ) 0td itXδ = . 
 
In essence, the first expression specifies that individuals participating a given quarter are selected 
in the same way regardless of the service they receive.  The underlying assumption is closely 
related to that made by Hotz, Imbens and Klerman (2005) to identify the relative importance of 
alternative services.  By conditioning on the quarter of service, we allow for the possibility that 
selection of individuals may differ by quarter of service (relative to the quarter of welfare entry), 
and that it may differ dramatically for those receiving no services. 
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The assumption that participation in assessment alone provides no benefits in later 
periods is reasonable on its face because of the limited time individuals spend in assessment.  
Given this assumption, an unbiased estimate of 0'itY  for an individual i who received service sit’>1 
in quarter tit’ and received no higher level service through t’ can be obtained from the earnings of 
individuals who received assessment in quarter tit’ and no higher level services up through 
quarter t’ but who have the same values of Xit.  For individual i who received services s (s=2, 3) 
in quarter t, the estimate of program impact on earnings d quarters later can be written as 
 
 1 '( )
s s
itd itd td itY Y Xδ = − , for s>1 , (6) 
 
where 1 '( )td itY X is the estimated earnings in quarter t’=t+d , based on matched cases that 
participate in assessment in quarter t. 
Accounting for Individual Fixed Effects 
Individual fixed effects estimators provide an alternative approach to controlling for 
differences across individuals who participate in different kinds of services.  This approach, in 
essence, produces estimates of the impact of work component participation by comparing a 
recipient=s experience prior to component participation with her subsequent experience.  Smith 
and Todd (2005) spell out the basic approach, which they describe as “difference-in-difference” 
matching.  For treated cases, the dependent variable is the difference between earnings in a 
period following participation and earnings prior to program participation, and for comparison 
cases the earnings difference is calculated over the same periods.  Even if individuals who obtain 
services differ in important ways from those in the comparison group, so long as such differences 
are stable over time in their impact on earnings, this specification can eliminate bias resulting 
from differences between participants and others.  The approach can be illustrated by returning 
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to the initial specification in (1), and subtracting earnings prior to service receipt from both sides 
of the equation, obtaining 
0
'( )
s s s
itd itd td it itdY Y XΔ = Δ + δ + ε , 
where 0' and 
s
itd itY YΔ Δ  are differenced earnings measures for individual i, and where t’=t+d.  We 
will take earlier earnings to be average earnings for the quarters after welfare entry and prior to 
the service quarter t, that is 
1
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" 0
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This approach removes the impact of any fixed individual effect that influences earnings both 
before and after program participation.  If the independence assumption (3) is violated because 
fixed effects differ for those receiving services and the comparison group, the assumption may 
still hold for the differenced measures, that is, it may be the case that   
0
' ' ' ', ) | , 'it it it itY s t X tΔ ⊥ ( . 
In this case, the differenced earnings for those not receiving treatment can be used to estimate 
what differenced earnings would have been for those who received some service in the absence 
of services, that is, in the counterfactual state.  The estimated program impact for case i is then 
written as  
 0 '( )
s s
itd itd td itY Y Xδ = Δ − Δ , (7) 
where 0 '( )td itY XΔ  is the mean differenced earnings for cases not receiving services up to t’, and 
matched to i on the basis of characteristics Xit’. 
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 A similar argument may apply in the case where those receiving assessment form the 
comparison group.  If (5) is violated because individuals who undertake assessment differ from 
those receiving more intensive services due to differences in expected fixed effects, then it may 
be that the condition put in terms of differences may still hold, 
'
0
' ' ' '| , , ',  for 0itit d it it it itY s X t t sΔ ⊥ > . 
This expression states that the differenced measure of the earnings i would receive in the absence 
of services is unrelated to which services i actually receives, conditional on i receiving some 
services (s>0).  Combined with the assumption that 1 '( ) 0td itXδ = , the estimate of the program 
s>1 effect for case i is given as 
 1 '( )
s s
itd itd itd itY Y Xδ = Δ − Δ , for s>1, (8) 
where 1 '( )td itY XΔ  is the mean differenced earnings for cases that receive assessment in t, received 
no other services in the next d quarters, and are matched to i on the basis of characteristics Xit’.  
Specification Tests   
Each of the above approaches makes certain assumptions in order to obtain estimates of effects 
of service receipt.  One natural specification test is to use the same methods to predict effects on 
earnings that precede participation in the program.  If we obtain nonzero impact estimates for 
these periods, this suggests that our methods are not properly accounting for unmeasured 
differences between those cases receiving services and those used in comparisons.  In particular, 
we will estimate the effects of service on earnings in the quarters after entering welfare but prior 
to receiving a service.  Consider the estimate of the impact of a service s in quarter t on earnings 
in quarter t’=t+d<t, i.e., where t>|d|>0, 
 0 '( )
s s
itd itd td itY Y Xδ = − , (9) 
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where sitdY  is earnings in quarter t’ for an individual receiving services in quarter t, and 
0
'( )td itY X is 
the earnings in t’ based on cases matched to i that receive no services up through at least t.  
Recall that the variables included in Xit’ are characteristics of the individual, earnings prior to 
entering welfare, and characteristics of the economy during the outcome quarter, but earnings 
following welfare entry and prior to t are not included.  Hence, our methods do not impose any 
mechanical requirement that matched cases have similar values on earnings in the quarters 
between welfare entry and service receipt.  If estimated “effects” on prior earnings are close to 
zero, this suggests that important differences may be largely controlled by our methods, 
supporting the validity of our impact estimates.18 
The same approach can be used to test the fixed effects specification (Heckman and Hotz, 
1989).  Equations (7) and (8) provide estimates of program effects for quarters following a 
service in quarter t.  However, for such a case, if one specifies an outcome quarter t’<t and a 
“pseudo” service quarter t*#t, an estimate of the “impact” of a service on prior quarters can be 
obtained.  In this case, the outcome measure is earnings in quarter t’ minus average earnings in 
quarters 0 through t*-1.  Impact estimates are based on comparing outcome measures for such 
treated cases (in this example, cases receiving treatment in quarter t) with identically calculated 
measures for matched comparison cases receiving either no treatment (equation (7)) or 
assessment (equation (8)) in quarter t. 
 
                                                 
18A similar specification test is easily constructed based on the comparison of services with assessment.  
Here 1 '( )
s s
itd itd td itY Y Xδ = − , where again we take outcome quarter t’=t+d<t.  1 '( )td itY X is the earnings in quarter t’ for 
individuals receiving assessment in quarter t who are matched to individual i.  
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VI. Estimation Details and Specification Test Results 
As indicated above, our impact estimates are based on propensity score matching.  We identify a 
treatment as a service s received in quarter t influencing earnings in quarter t’, which is d=t’–t 
quarters following treatment.  We specify t=0 as the quarter of entry onto welfare, and we limit 
consideration to treatments involving service quarters up through t=10, since a relatively small 
proportion of services are received after the tenth quarter.  We consider t’=0 to 15, so we 
examine 16 outcome quarters beginning with the quarter of entry to welfare.19 
For a given treated subsample, defined by (t, d, t’, s), we identify a set of comparison 
individuals who contribute quarters such that time since entry is identical to the treated 
subsample.  The estimates based on (4) or (7) use earnings in quarter t’ for individuals who 
participated in no work component activity up to that point.  The estimates based on (6) or (8) 
use a comparison sample of individuals who participated in assessment in quarter t, and are 
observed to have received no higher level services through quarter t’.  This latter comparison 
sample is the same as the treatment subsample (t, d, t’, 1). 
In undertaking propensity score matching for a given treatment subsample and its 
comparison group, we fit a logit using Xit’ to predict whether a case is a treated or a comparison 
case and then use estimated coefficients to construct a predicted probability or “propensity 
score” for each case.  We include a fairly extensive set of variables in this model, identifying 
both individual characteristics and prior labor market experience.20  We also enter dummies 
                                                 
 19Recall services are coded as s=0 for no service, s=1 for assessment, s=2 for job search/readiness training, 
and s=3 for intensive training activities, where codes identify the highest level service received to that point after 
entering welfare (see Table 3). 
20Personal and family characteristics include age and age squared, nonwhite, a dummy identifying 
education less than high school, number of children, and age of youngest child.  Based on the two years prior to 
entering welfare, we include variables identifying the proportion of quarters working, a dummy for no work and a 
dummy for working all eight quarters, total earnings in the four quarters immediately prior to entering welfare, 
earnings in the fifth through eighth quarters prior to entering welfare, and the proportion of the eight quarters prior 
to the observed entry in which welfare was received. 
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identifying the calendar quarter of the outcome, the county unemployment rate during that 
quarter, and dummies identifying 17 county groups in Missouri and 24 county groups in North 
Carolina. Subject to parametric assumptions and small numbers limitations, a treated and 
comparison case with the same propensity score will have the same distribution of values on Xit 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), that is, the estimated propensity score is a balancing score. 
We employ radius matching in order to identify comparison cases that correspond with 
our treated cases.  For each treated case within the subgroup, we designate as “matches” all 
comparison cases that have propensity score values that are within 0.005 of the treated case.21  
This method not only allows for more than one comparison case to be matched with a treated 
case, but, because the matching search in the comparison sample is done with replacement, it 
also allows a given comparison case to be matched with more than one treated case.  The mean 
outcome for cases matched with a given treated case is an estimate of the outcome that would 
occur for the treated case in the absence of the service.22   
Since the propensity score is based on fitting a parametric structure, it is necessary to test 
to assure that the estimated propensity score is successful in balancing values of matched 
treatment and comparison cases (see Smith and Todd, 2005).  Following the matching, within a 
given treatment subsample, we compared the means of each variable for the treated cases and the 
weighted comparison cases.  Since there are over 40 variables and up to 110 treatment 
subsamples for each comparison, this implies as many as 5000 comparisons for each comparison 
                                                 
 21 We tested alternative radius values using least squares leave-one-out cross-validation methods (Black 
and Smith, 2004), and found that a radius of 0.005 performed at least as well as larger values.   
 22A recent paper by Abadie and Imbens (2004) argues that, in general, matching estimates include a bias 
term that disappears relatively slowly as sample size increases.  They suggest that “bias adjustment” based on a 
linear model can improve the performance of estimates.  Our estimates of impact include a bias adjustment term to 
correct for any differences between treated and matched comparisons cases.  The coefficient used for adjustment is 
based on a regression within the weighted comparison cases, estimated separately for each treatment subsample.  If 
matching is successful, the adjustment will be small.  The bias adjustments had little substantive impact on our 
results. 
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made.  We found that our initial logit specification, in which the log odds of the probability was 
assumed to be a linear, additive function of our variables, was successful at balancing the 
variables.  Overall, we found that far fewer than 5 percent of the differences were statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level, implying that matching was more successful than chance at 
balancing the specified variables.23   
Frequently, matching estimates are limited by a failure of overlap in the distributions of 
variables for treated and comparison cases.  Although our use of a relatively small matching 
radius of 0.005 helps to assure comparability for matched cases, it increases the possibility that 
not all treated cases will be matched.  In fact, because of the large number of comparison cases, 
over 97 percent of treated cases were matched for each set of outcome estimates reported 
below.24 
 Conventionally, standard errors of propensity score matching estimates are obtained 
using bootstrap methods, since there is no analytical formula that accounts fully for the influence 
of sampling error on propensity score matching estimates.  However, where samples sizes are 
very large, as ours are, the bootstrap is impractical (e.g., Lechner, 2001).  We therefore present 
analytical standard errors based on the simplifying assumption that the estimate 
s
itdδ  is an 
independent draw across all treated cases i. 
To determine how these analytical standard errors compare with those obtained from a 
bootstrap, we calculated bootstrap standard errors using 100 replications in analyzing the effect 
of assessment on earnings three quarters after receipt of services.  For estimates based on the ten 
subsamples (identifying a quarter of service receipt relative to welfare entry), the analytical 
                                                 
 23It is important to recognize that this comparison is not a statistical test.  The implication of our results is 
that differences on measured variables after matching are small relative to sampling error.  
 24 In some of the specification tests, the proportion matched was somewhat lower, in one case as low as 50 
percent.  This resulted from our small radius size in conjunction with a small comparison group.  Omitted cases 
appear to be largely random.  Note that failure of overlap does not invalidate the specification test. 
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standard errors were smaller than the bootstrap standard errors, but the difference was less than 
10 percent in all cases but one.  For the overall estimate, the analytical standard error was 15 
percent smaller than the bootstrap standard error.  This limited comparison suggests that our use 
of analytical standard errors is unlikely to be seriously misleading.25 
Specification Test Results 
Following the structure described above (equation (9) and footnote 18), we have performed 
specification tests that predict the levels of earnings in the quarters prior to participation in a 
work component activity but following entry onto welfare.  If the methods we use are valid, we 
should not find significant impacts.  Results of these specification tests are reported in Table 5.  
Given our very large sample sizes, these tests were undertaken on a random 25 percent sample of 
individuals in the Missouri data, and on a 20 percent sample in the North Carolina data. 
Impact estimates for the comparison of participants with a comparison group that 
received no service are reported columns 1-3, for Missouri, and columns 6-8 for North Carolina.  
In most cases, estimated impacts are negative, substantial, and statistically significant.  For 
example, in Missouri, individuals receiving assessment have earnings in the six quarters prior to 
receiving those services that are between $291 and $357 below earnings for individuals not 
receiving services in a given quarter, and estimates for earlier quarters imply a deficit that is 
generally in excess of $100, although large standard errors render many of them statistically 
insignificant.  Negative effects are also large for those participating in job search/readiness or 
intensive activities.  Comparable estimates for North Carolina are also substantial and negative 
                                                 
 25We expect the true standard error to exceed the analytical standard error for two reasons.  First, the 
analytical standard error cannot account for error in estimation of the propensity score, which may increase the true 
standard error.  Second, our matching methods allow a comparison quarter to be matched with more than one treated 
case, and also allow a given individual to contribute to the comparison sample in more than one subsample.  Our 
bootstrapping methods accounted for both sources of error, as each repetition selects a sample (with replacement) 
from the sample of individuals and in each repetition re-estimates the propensity score. 
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for all three categories of service.26  Clearly, these estimates show that individuals receiving 
services are systematically different from those who do not receive services.  It is therefore 
unlikely that estimates of program impact on subsequent earnings based on comparisons with 
nonparticipants will identify true program effects. 
Columns 4-5 and 9-10 also provide estimates of impact on prior earnings, but these are 
based on a model that compares those participating in job search/readiness training and those 
participating in intensive training with those who are only assessed.  Looking first at Missouri, 
for job search/readiness, the estimated impacts of participation on the six prior quarters are 
positive and often statistically significant with quite a bit of variation from quarter to quarter.  
Estimates for intensive training are usually negative, with the estimate for the prior quarter at 
!$115.  Estimates for quarters more than five prior to participation are generally smaller and not 
statistically significant.  These results suggest that, in the case of Missouri, the model that uses 
assessment as the comparison group is more likely to provide adequate estimates of program 
impact, but the possibility of bias remains. 
The results for North Carolina for job search/readiness training, when compared with 
assessment (column 9) show a negative impact of $117 in the quarter preceding service, but 
otherwise estimates are inconsistent and generally not statistically significant.  In contrast, the 
estimates of intensive training impacts on prior earnings for North Carolina (reported in column 
10) are almost all negative, and most are statistically significant.  The average across the six 
quarters prior to service is !$134.  This suggests that individuals participating in intensive 
activities are systematically less successful than those selected into assessment, even when 
                                                 
 26It should be stressed that all the estimates reported in this table identify only quarters after entry onto 
welfare, as employment prior to labor market entry is controlled in these analyses. 
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individuals’ measured characteristics and labor market success prior to welfare entry are 
controlled. 
We also performed specification tests for the fixed-effects model.  Given that the results 
reported in Table 5 imply that cases receiving no services differ dramatically in terms of prior 
measures from those that receive services, we limit consideration to estimates that use 
assessment as the comparison group.  As in the previous specification test, we identify an 
“effect” on earnings prior to receipt of actual service.  As detailed above, the fixed-effects 
specification test requires that a quarter be chosen as a “pseudo” service quarter prior to the 
outcome quarter of interest.  Estimates reported here are based on all such possible quarters.27 
Table 6 suggests that the fixed effects model is more successful than the simple levels 
structure.  In the case of job search/readiness, estimates are not statistically significant for either 
state.  In the case of intensive activities in Missouri (column 2), although the estimate for the 
immediately prior quarter borders on statistical significance, it is of modest size; other estimates 
are small and not statistically significant.  However, the results provide only limited support for 
the use of the fixed effect estimate for intensive activities in North Carolina.  The estimates of 
the effect of participation on earnings in the prior two quarters are !$165 and !$99, which, 
although smaller than comparable estimates in Table 5, are statistically significant.  Impact 
estimates for earnings in earlier quarters are much smaller and not statistically significant, in 
marked contrast to results reported in Table 5, suggesting that the fixed-effects model is more 
likely to be successful in providing valid impact estimates.  
 
 
                                                 
 27 A given outcome quarter will therefore appear multiple times in the analysis.  In calculating estimates, 
we have weighted each quarter by the inverse of the number of times it appears the analysis. Standard errors also are 
calculated using this weighting scheme. 
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VII. Effects of Work Component Participation 
Given the results of the specification tests, we focus on models that obtain estimates based on a 
comparison of individuals who receive job search/readiness training and intensive services with 
those receiving assessment services.  Estimates based on the simple outcome model are reported 
in Table 7 and Figure 3 and estimates based on the fixed-effects model are presented in Table 8.  
In each case, we examine estimates of impact on earnings in the quarter of participation and the 
15 successive quarters (14 for the fixed-effects model) in Missouri and North Carolina.   
Panel A in Figure 3 shows that the estimated effects for job search/readiness do not 
change dramatically at greater time lags.  In both states, effect estimates are slightly lower in the 
quarter of service and the following quarter, but after an increase do not change up through 
quarter 13.  However, the levels of effect estimates differ dramatically by state, with numbers 
very close to zero in Missouri, and consistently negative in North Carolina.  Notwithstanding 
these differences, we have no evidence that this work component provides any meaningful 
benefits—either in the long term or the short term—for participants.  Standard errors, illustrated 
with bars in Figure 3, are small, suggesting that observed patterns are not influenced by sampling 
error. 
Panel B in Figure 3 presents impact estimates for intensive training.  For Missouri, 
estimates imply reduced earnings in the quarter of service and the immediately following quarter, 
but progressively greater earnings in later quarters, with impact becoming positive in quarter 7.  
In contrast, although the pattern of effects is very similar, the North Carolina effects are below 
those of Missouri, especially in the later quarters.  Only beginning in quarter 13 are the North 
Carolina impact estimates positive.  The average impact in Missouri for the last five quarters is 
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nearly $250 per year and clearly statistically significant.  For North Carolina, the average is less 
than $50 and is not statistically significant (see Table 7).   
Our specification tests suggested that estimates based on the comparison of services with 
assessment may not fully control for selection into service type.  The bias would appear to be 
particularly serious for North Carolina.  In the quarter prior to participating in intensive services, 
individual earnings are $185 less than the earnings of those who are only assessed, and earnings 
in the prior three quarters are between $66 and $209 below those who are merely assessed.  
Bearing this in mind, we may well question the estimates obtained from this specification. 
The results of the specification test for Missouri are more supportive of this model, and 
we therefore believe the Missouri estimates are better indicators of program impact.  These 
estimates imply that the program has some costs, but the overall net returns would appear to be 
positive.  In terms of forgone earnings, if we simply add up the negative earnings increments 
estimated for quarters 0-6, we find that total earnings in these seven quarters are reduced by 
$1561 (standard error $27).  The average earnings increment in the five last quarters is $246, or 
nearly $1000 per year.  If such an increment remained in effect for a thirty-year working life, 
using a 6 percent discount rate, the earnings gains would exceed the initial earnings loss by more 
than $10,000 in net present value at the time of participation.  Since most estimates suggest that 
the costs of providing training programs are often less than $2000 per person (e.g., Orr, et al., 
1996), these figures obviously suggest that the program would pay for itself. 
Although the results differ in important respects, it is worth noting that in both states the 
basic pattern of earnings movement is similar.  Individuals receiving job search services 
experience very little earnings gains after participating in the program relative to those who are 
only assessed.  In contrast, in both states individuals receiving intensive services experience 
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fairly steadily rising earnings after receiving training, relative to those who are only assessed.  
These patterns closely mirror the results in Hotz, Imbens and Klerman (2005).  In their 
revaluation of the California GAIN program Hotz, Imbens and Klerman find that, relative to 
persons receiving job search services, individuals receiving more intensive training exhibit rising 
earnings in the period after completing the program and that, in the long run, the more intensive 
training programs provide greater benefits than the short-term job search programs.  This is 
clearly what we see in Missouri—in the long run the intensive training programs produce higher 
benefits than the short-term job search programs.  This is also the case in North Carolina, 
although our estimates suggest that the benefits for job search are negative, while those for the 
more intensive programs are small. 
Given that our specification tests suggest potential problems with the model, especially 
for North Carolina, Table 8 presents estimates based on the differenced analysis that controls for 
individual fixed effects that are constant over time.28  For Missouri, we find that estimates of the 
effect of intensive services change very little relative to the previous model, whereas estimates 
for job search/readiness shift.  Job search/readiness appears to have a moderate negative effect 
on earnings during the earlier period and a substantial positive effect later.  If we believe these 
estimates are valid, we would judge job search/readiness to provide benefits as great as the 
intensive services.  Estimates in North Carolina shift most dramatically for intensive services.  
The pattern of returns now mimics that for Missouri fairly closely.  Job search/readiness 
continues to have a substantial negative impact, but not as great as the negative effect estimated 
by the prior model.   
                                                 
 28In order to estimate the fixed-effects model, it is necessary to have at least one quarter prior to service 
receipt after coming onto welfare.  Hence, the estimates do not include those receiving services in quarter 0.  Since 
individuals are only followed for a total of 16 quarters, Table 8 reports estimates only for the 14 quarters after the 
participation quarter.   
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In summary, given the specification test results, we believe that the estimates reported in 
either Table 7 or Table 8 for Missouri provide useful estimates of program impact, indicating 
that in the long run, the more intensive training activities produce greater benefits than short-
term job search/readiness.   In the case of North Carolina, we put greater emphasis on the 
estimates in Table 8, which show a similar pattern of effects. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
We use administrative data on welfare participants in two states, Missouri and North Carolina, 
earnings data for a number of periods after these individuals have participated in a work 
component, and propensity score matching methods to estimate the effect on earnings of 
participating in short-term job search/readiness activities versus participating in longer-term 
intensive training.  Our results, taken as a whole, indicate that short-term job search/readiness 
programs have minimal long-term impacts.  In contrast, we find that the longer-term intensive 
training programs initially have substantial negative effects, but these effects turn positive within 
two years of program participation and appear to persist.   
Our results are similar to those of Hotz, Imbens and Klerman (2005) and suggest that 
more intensive training programs provide greater benefits than short-term programs.  These 
results also suggest that an emphasis on work-first programs is likely misplaced and that 
administrators should place more emphasis on programs designed to enhance participants’ 
general human capital. 
 Our analysis also underscores the point that in order to judge the efficacy of long-run 
intensive training programs, participants must be followed for an extended period after their 
program involvement, since it takes a considerable amount of time before effects become 
positive.  Our estimates are consistent with the pattern of returns expected from most human 
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capital investments—for example, college education—in that they often require some period of 
time to appear.  Unfortunately, the policy emphasis on work-first activities reflects in part the 
fact that performance measures used in evaluating welfare and other public training programs are 
short-term in focus, and it is clear from this study that a short-term perspective will 
underestimate the benefits of more intensive training and possibly misdirect the allocation of 
training resources. 
Finally, our results, like those of Autor and Houseman (2005), also illustrate the 
importance of applying tests to evaluate the underlying assumptions for models used to estimate 
program effects based on non-experimental data.  In the absence of specification tests, 
researchers are left with little basis for choosing among results produced by alternative models. 
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Table 1: Work Component Activities Duration and Intensity
Activity
25th 
Percentile
Median 
Duration 
75th 
Percentile
25th 
Percentile
Median 
Duration 
75th 
Percentile
Assessment 1.6 4.9 59.7 20 0.0 1.4 4.3 3
Job search and job readiness training 1.6 4.4 23.0 25 2.4 4.9 10.3 20
Work experience 1.9 6.4 28.1 20 2.4 5.7 12.1 26
Basic education 1.6 5.9 30.9 20 4.1 8.4 15.0 20
Vocational and technical skills training 2.6 9.4 44.4 25 2.7 6.3 13.0 35
Post-secondary education 3.6 19.3 116.4 17 7.4 13.8 24.5 42.5
Note: Statistics are based on all work component activities that begin in the quarters 1997:2-2000:2 in Missouri and 1997:2-2001:4 in 
North Carolina for TANF payees who are females, aged at least 18 but less than 65, in the single parent program and not in child only 
cases. 
Missouri North Carolina
Duration (Weeks) Median 
Hours per 
Week
Duration (Weeks) Median 
Hours per 
Week
Table 2: Component Order
1 Tie (1) 2 Tie (2) 3 Total
Assessment 51.7% 34.6% 9.8% 2.1% 1.8% 100.0%
Job Search / Readiness 46.8% 25.6% 15.2% 2.2% 10.2% 100.0%
Intensive Training 30.2% 39.9% 20.5% 0.0% 9.5% 100.0%
Assessment 52.6% 45.6% 1.0% 0.3% 0.5% 100.0%
Job Search / Readiness 7.3% 56.8% 17.0% 6.5% 12.4% 100.0%
Intensive Training 5.4% 52.3% 17.1% 7.5% 17.7% 100.0%
Ordering
Missouri
North Carolina
Note:  Each row is based on the number of individuals entering welfare who 
participated in the specified service at some time in the 16 quarters after entry.  
Ordering is determined by quarter of participation, with ties identifying 
participation in the same quarter.  See text.
Table 3: Outcome Earnings Coding Example
Quarter Service Received Service Code
0 No Service s i 0=0
1 No Service s i 1=0
2 Assessment s i 2=1
3 No Service s i 3=1
4 No Service s i 4=1
5 Job Search/Readiness s i 5=2
6 No service s i 6=2
7 Intensive Services s i 7=3
8 No Service s i 8=3
9 Job Search/Readiness1 s i 9=3
10 No Service s i, 10=3
: : :  :
15 No Service s i, 16=3
1This service has no impact on the coding.
Notes:
     s it'
All quarters are specified relative to the quarter entering welfare (quarter 0).
is highest level service received since entering welfare to time t' .
Observed Earnings
is earnings in quarter t' =t +d , conditional on participating in service  s 
(s =1, 2, 3) in quarter t , d  quarters earlier.   
is earnings in quarter t' conditional on no participation in any service 
since entering welfare.
is observed earnings in quarter t'  for individual i .
0
0 0i iY Y=
0
1 1i iY Y=
1
2 20i iY Y=
1
3 21i iY Y=
1
4 22i iY Y=
2
5 50i iY Y=
2
6 51i iY Y=
3
7 70i iY Y=
3
8 71i iY Y=
3
9 72i iY Y=
3
,10 73i iY Y=
3
,10 78i iY Y=
s
itdY
'itY
0
'itY
Table 4: Component Cumulative Participation by Quarter After TANF Entry (Percent)
Quarter After 
TANF Entry
No 
Component 
Receiving 
TANF
No 
Component 
and Exit 
from TANF
Assessment 
Only
Job Search/ 
Readiness, No 
Intensive 
Training
Intensive 
Training
Total 
Participating 
in Any 
Activity1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0 90.2 0.0 5.1 1.8 3.0 9.8
1 64.8 14.8 8.9 4.0 7.6 20.4
2 44.8 28.8 11.3 5.4 9.8 26.4
3 32.8 36.4 12.6 6.6 11.6 30.8
5 19.4 43.5 13.5 9.3 14.3 37.1
7 11.6 46.3 13.7 11.7 16.8 42.2
11 5.9 45.9 14.2 13.9 20.1 48.2
15 3.3 44.7 14.2 14.6 23.2 52.0
0 90.9 0.0 6.2 1.7 1.2 9.1
1 65.9 11.1 13.1 5.0 4.9 23.0
2 40.2 31.6 14.6 6.4 7.2 28.2
3 26.7 41.2 15.8 7.4 8.9 32.1
5 13.7 47.6 17.4 9.3 12.0 38.7
7 7.2 49.6 17.8 10.4 14.9 43.2
11 2.6 49.4 18.1 11.3 18.6 48.0
15 1.6 48.0 17.9 11.7 20.8 50.4
1Sum of columns 3-5.
Missouri
North Carolina
Notes:  Columns 1 and 2 identify individuals who have not participated in any work component since 
entering welfare; the former includes only individuals receiving welfare during the specified quarter; the 
latter includes individuals who are not receiving welfare.  A small portion of recipients included in 
column 1 will have exited following the initial welfare entry and then re-entered welfare.  Individuals are 
followed for 16 quarters after entry without regard to whether they exited welfare during the period.
Table 5: Matching Estimates of "Effects" of Services on Earnings in Prior Quarters
Quarter Relative to 
Service
Assessment 
vs. No 
Service
Job Search/ 
Readiness vs. 
No Service
Intensive 
vs. No 
Service
Job Search/ 
Readiness vs. 
Assessment
Intensive vs. 
Assessment
Assessment 
vs. No 
Service
Job Search/ 
Readiness vs. 
No Service
Intensive 
vs. No 
Service
Job Search/ 
Readiness vs. 
Assessment
Intensive vs. 
Assessment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
-353 -337 -497 103 -115 -322 -447 -610 -117 -184
(21) (22) (17) (30) (20) (21) (23) (19) (34) (24)
-345 -278 -432 94 -53 -315 -400 -501 -37 -153
(27) (26) (22) (35) (30) (29) (33) (24) (58) (39)
-357 -250 -375 128 -68 -327 -322 -461 161 -66
(29) (29) (26) (42) (35) (32) (35) (27) (163) (46)
-302 -192 -312 112 -140 -263 -275 -394 -35 -209
(36) (30) (30) (59) (48) (36) (39) (29) (100) (54)
-291 -146 -340 247 -26 -236 -234 -357 -73 -168
(43) (35) (30) (75) (49) (50) (44) (32) (127) (62)
-333 -158 -268 203 73 -203 -221 -319 360 -26
(43) (37) (34) (78) (55) (56) (51) (39) (207) (82)
-149 -114 -255 93 -78 -101 -256 -318 49 -298
(87) (50) (39) (90) (84) (68) (59) (43) (370) (103)
-148 -100 -173 103 47 -70 -291 -298 -564 -53
(76) (54) (43) (204) (94) (75) (63) (45) (245) (135)
-84 -37 -16 -27 89 -134 -311 -258 -24 558
(79) (78) (59) (413) (111) (90) (72) (52) (297) (456)
-191 -53 -100 -1753 -178 -71 -76 -174 436 -161
(81) (75) (76) (945) (123) (99) (118) (75) (682) (297)
Number of quarters 106,185 107,606 110,576 19,637 22,194 78,640 76,915 83,535 15,785 21,099
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Variables used for propensity score prediction: calendar quarter of the outcome, county unemployment rate during quarter, and dummies identifying 
17 county groups in Missouri and 24 county groups in North Carolina, age and age squared, nonwhite, education less than high school, number of 
children, and age of youngest child; proportion of quarters working, and dummies for no work and working all eight quarters, based on eight quarters 
prior to entering welfare; total earnings in the four quarters immediately prior to entering welfare, earnings in the fifth through eighth quarters prior to 
entering welfare, and the proportion of the eight quarters prior to entering welfare in which welfare was received.
Missouri analyses are based on a 25 percent random sample of all individuals; North Carolina analyses are based on a 20 percent sample.
Comparison cases matched exactly on outcome quarter and, for columns 4, 5, 9 and 10, also quarter of participation.  Within an exact match 
subsample, comparison matches are based on radius matching using propensity score.  See text for details.
Missouri North Carolina 
-5
-6
-1
-2
-3
Dependent variable: earnings in quarters prior to participation.
-4
-9
-10
-7
-8
Quarter Relative to 
Service
Job Search/ 
Readiness vs. 
Assessment
Intensive vs. 
Assessment
Job Search/ 
Readiness vs. 
Assessment
Intensive vs. 
Assessment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
57 -41 -46 -165
(57) (21) (38) (40)
25 -17 -21 -99
(39) (19) (49) (36)
19 -4 37 -24
(46) (20) (71) (33)
-4 -13 -1 -16
(79) (21) (78) (42)
14 -7 54 -21
(88) (25) (121) (57)
34 8 -6 0
(50) (34) (173) (66)
51 -13 -64 -1
(123) (51) (211) (70)
17 -12 -7 -81
(292) (56) (173) (140)
2 -2 35 -60
(369) (62) (58) (288)
Number of quarters 9,859 11,728 6,506 10,370
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Comparison cases matched exactly on outcome quarter, quarter of participation and "pseudo" 
service quarter.  Within an exact match subsample, comparison matches are based on radius 
matching using propensity score.  See text for details.
Variables used for propensity score prediction: See table 5.
-1
-2
Missouri analyses are based on a 25 percent sample of all individuals; North Carolina analyses 
are based on a 20 percent sample.
Dependent variable: earnings in quarters prior to participation minus earnings prior to "pseudo" 
service quarter.
-7
-8
-9
Table 6: Matching Estimates of "Effects" of Services on Earnings in Prior Quarters: Fixed 
Effects Estimates
-3
-4
-5
-6
Missouri North Carolina
Quarter Relative to 
Service
Job Search/ Readiness 
vs. Assessment
Intensive vs. 
Assessment
Job Search/ Readiness 
vs. Assessment
Intensive vs. 
Assessment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-46 -302 -245 -383
(9) (6) (8) (6)
-52 -444 -210 -505
(13) (8) (13) (9)
12 -303 -124 -279
(15) (10) (18) (13)
8 -238 -265 -263
(16) (10) (21) (15)
33 -137 -143 -222
(17) (11) (18) (13)
-5 -115 -172 -204
(18) (12) (22) (15)
6 -23 -159 -166
(20) (13) (21) (16)
14 17 -146 -151
(21) (14) (22) (18)
-20 57 -190 -119
(22) (15) (24) (19)
-5 67 -182 -107
(24) (17) (27) (22)
73 137 -202 -66
(27) (19) (30) (30)
40 136 -219 -9
(32) (22) (34) (35)
73 174 -218 -30
(39) (28) (41) (39)
13 162 -95 109
(47) (36) (49) (45)
168 355 -113 60
(59) (44) (59) (57)
174 402 -126 105
(101) (78) (104) (121)
94 246 -154 47
(27) (21) (28) (30)
Number of quarters 234,251 265,317 257,002 311,482
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Missouri North Carolina
0
1
2
3
4
5
13
6
7
8
9
Comparison cases matched exactly on outcome quarter and quarter of participation.  Within an exact match 
subsample, comparison matches are based on radius matching using propensity score.  See text for details.
Variables used for propensity score prediction: See Table 5.
Dependent variable: earnings in quarters following program participation.
Table 7: Matching Estimates of Impact of Services on Earnings in Later Quarters
14
15
11-15 (Mean)
10
11
12
Quarter Relative to 
Service
Job Search/ Readiness 
vs. Assessment
Intensive vs. 
Assessment
Job Search/ Readiness 
vs. Assessment
Intensive vs. 
Assessment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-115 -337 -248 -283
(12) (6) (11) (7)
-81 -436 -176 -358
(16) (9) (16) (10)
-24 -316 -141 -184
(18) (11) (23) (14)
12 -265 -120 -118
(20) (11) (24) (16)
22 -161 -106 -80
(22) (12) (23) (15)
-31 -153 -107 -64
(23) (13) (24) (17)
-26 -65 -101 -21
(26) (14) (26) (18)
11 -39 -68 13
(28) (15) (29) (20)
-50 -16 -89 39
(31) (17) (31) (22)
18 7 -109 60
(34) (20) (34) (25)
117 97 -128 97
(38) (22) (38) (31)
138 133 -148 152
(46) (26) (44) (37)
163 127 -145 116
(62) (34) (52) (45)
111 144 18 313
(75) (44) (63) (53)
328 363 -68 235
(104) (57) (76) (68)
185 191 -86 204
(37) (21) (30) (26)
Number of quarters 158,285 193,178 177,064 236,162
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Missouri North Carolina
0
7
8
1
2
3
4
Table 8: Estimates of Impact of Services on Earnings in Later Quarters: Fixed Effects Estimates 
13
14
11-14 (Mean)
9
10
11
12
5
6
Comparison cases matched exactly on outcome quarter and quarter of participation.  Within an exact 
match subsample, comparison matches are based on radius matching using propensity score.  See text 
Variables used for propensity score prediction: See Table 5.
Dependent variable: earnings for quarters following participation minus average average earnings for 
quarters prior to participation.
Participation in quarter 0 is not considered, since prior earnings following welfare entry are not 
available.  As a result, only 14 outcome quarters are available following participation.
Figure 1: Patterns of Average Quarterly Earnings for Paricipants in Work 
Components by Quarters of Participation: Missouri
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Figure 2: Patterns of Average Quarterly Earnings for Paricipants in Work 
Components by Quarters of Participation: North Carolina
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Note: Standard errors identified by verticle bars.  See Table 7 for estimation details.
Figure 3: Patterns of Estimated Impact by Quarter Relative to Participaton
A. Job Search/Readiness vs. Assessment
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B. Intensive vs. Assessment
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Appendix 
 
I. Coding Methodology and Source for Variables in Xit 
 
Time-varying characteristics in Xit 
 
Variable: Calendar-quarter indicators for outcome quarter. 
Coding: Indicator equals one if current quarter and equals zero otherwise (18 quarters). 
Source: Generated from welfare and unemployment insurance records. 
 
Variable: Age and age squared. 
Coding: Age in years at end of current quarter, rounded up to the nearest twelfth of a year. 
Source: Calculated using the date of birth recorded in individual's welfare records. 
 
Variable: Age of youngest child. 
Coding: Age of youngest child in years at the end of the current quarter.  Birth date of the youngest 
child is established as of the most recent quarter receiving welfare.  Rounded up to the nearest twelfth 
of a year. 
Source: Date of birth of youngest dependent child associated with an individual's welfare case. 
 
Variable: Number of children. 
Coding: Number of children as of the most recent quarter receiving welfare. 
Source: Number of dependent children associated with an individual's welfare case. 
 
Variable: County unemployment rate. 
Coding: Mean monthly unemployment rate for current quarter in most recent county of residence while 
receiving welfare. 
Source: State unemployment statistics. 
 
Variable: Workforce Investment Area (WIA) geographic indicators. 
Coding:  Indicator for a WIA equals one if an individual's county of residence as of the most recent 
quarter receiving welfare is in the given WIA and zero otherwise.  In Missouri, which had fewer WIA 
areas, separate indicator variables for counties with a population greater than 100,000 were created 
even if the county was part of a larger WIA area.  There were 17 geographic areas identified in 
Missouri and 24 in North Carolina. 
Source: United States Department of Labor WIA Classifications 
 
Time-invariant individual characteristics in Xit  (may vary by spell for an individual) 
 
Variable: Race indicator 
Coding: Equals one if individual is not Caucasian, equals zero otherwise. 
Source: Individual welfare records 
 
Variable: Education indicator 
Coding: Equals one if an individual had not earned a high school diploma or equivalent as of the first 
quarter of current welfare spell, equals zero otherwise. 
Source: Education records associated with individual's welfare case. 
 
Variable: Proportion of eight quarters prior to welfare entry receiving welfare. 
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Coding: Range zero (no receipt of welfare in eight quarters prior to welfare entry) to 0.875 (received 
welfare payments in seven of eight prior quarters).  Note: by definition, an individual is coded as 
entering welfare in quarter t only if she received no welfare in quarter t-1. 
Source: Individual welfare records. 
 
Variable: Proportion of eight quarters prior to welfare entry with positive earnings. 
Coding: Range zero (no labor market earnings) to one (positive earnings in all eight quarters).  
Variables in Xit also include an indicator that equals one if and only if the proportion working variable 
equals zero and an indicator that equals one if and only if the proportion working variable equals one. 
Source: State unemployment insurance wage records. 
 
Variable: Cumulative earnings in the four quarters preceding the welfare entry. 
Coding: Missing earnings data coded as zero. 
Source: State unemployment insurance wage records. 
 
Variable: Cumulative earnings in quarters five through eight prior to welfare entry. 
Coding: Missing earnings data coded as zero. 
Source: State unemployment insurance records. 
 
 
II. Bias Adjustment 
Our estimates of impact include a bias adjustment term, following Abadie and Imbens (2004), which 
corrects for any differences between treated and matched comparisons cases.  Consider the impact 
estimate as specified in the paper as 
0
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s s
itd itd t itY Y Xδ = − , 
where sitdY  is earnings in quarter t’=t+d for treated case i receiving service s in quarter t.  The bias 
adjustment implies that the estimate of earnings based on nonparticipant comparison cases matched to 
treated case i is given as 
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where Ni is the number of comparison cases matched to case i, 0'jtY is the observed earnings of 
comparison case j matched to case i, Xjt’ is a vector of observed characteristics of comparison case j, r 
is the matching radius and P(X) is the propensity score, and $ is the coefficient estimated from a 
regression predicting earnings within the weighted comparison cases in the treatment subsample. 
For estimates based on comparison of assessment with more intensive services, the impact 
estimate for case i is written as 
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We may write the bias-adjusted estimate based on the comparison cases matched to i as 
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Expressions for bias-adjusted fixed effects estimates are computed similarly.   
If the matching is successful, the expression (Xit’ – Xjt’) will be small, so that the adjustment will 
be small.  Conversely, if the linear model is fully adequate as a predictor of earnings, the estimates will 
be unbiased even when matching is poor. 
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III. Analytical Standard Errors 
 
Analytical standard errors reported in the paper are based on the assumption that each estimate 
s
itdδ  can 
be treated as an independent draw across all treated cases i.  This approach can be interpreted in the 
following terms.  Consider the true impact for individual i based on the model in the paper  
0
' '( )
s s s
itd it td it itdY Y X− = δ + ε . 
If we simplify the structure so that the program effect does not depend on Xit’ , we may write 
0
'
s s s
itd it td itdY Y− = δ + ε . 
Of course, we do not observe 0'itY , but rather an estimate of it based on the cases that are 
matched to i, which we have designated 0' '( )t itY X .  If we assume that this estimate differs from the true 
value by an independent estimation error uitd  (i.e., 0 0' ' '( )t it it itdY X Y u= + ), the estimate of the effect for 
case i can be written as 
0
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Based on the assumption that  and itd itdug  are i.i.d., both with mean zero, the standard error of the 
estimated effect, (1/ )
td
s s
td itdtd
i T
N
∈
δ = δ∑  is calculated in the conventional way, as 
SE( ) SD( ) /
s s
td itd tdNδ = δ  . 
The standard error for 
s
dδ  is calculated using the standard deviation across all sitdδ , where 0#t#10. 
 We expect that true standard errors will exceed our estimated standard errors insofar as uitd are 
not independent for all treated cases i.  However, if the variation in itdg  is large relative to the variation 
in itdu , the bias in the analytical standard error may be modest even where uitd are positively correlated. 
